Abstract. An intrusion tolerant database uses damage assessment techniques to detect damage propagation scales in a corrupted database system. Traditional damage assessment approaches in a intrusion tolerant database system can only locate damages which are caused by reading corrupted data. In fact, there are many other damage spreading patterns that have not been considered in traditional damage assessment model. In this paper, we systematically analyze inter-transaction dependency relationships that have been neglected in the previous research and propose four different dependency relationships between transactions which may cause damage propagation. We extend existing damage assessment model based on the four novel dependency relationships. The essential properties of our model is also discussed.
Introduction
A database system being able to detect intrusions and recover compromised data back to a consistent state is claimed to be an intrusion tolerant database system (or attack resistant, or self healing system) [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] . As it is shown in Fig. 1 , most intrusion tolerant database systems consist of the following modules: System Log, Intrusion Detector, Damage Assessor, and Data Repairer. The clients commit various transactions to execute the application logic, and these transactions affect the integrity and consistency of a database system. The Intrusion Detector tracks clients' behaviors, and detects intrusion activities of malicious clients based on the system log. For the data that is corrupted by malicious transactions, the Damage Assessor detects the scale of damage propagation and the Data Repairer generates compensation transactions to repair the compromised data. An intrusion tolerant database is built based on a traditional relational model. It can be considered as an extension to the relational database system since the modules can be either built into the kernel of DBMS [3] [4] [5] [6] or developed on top of DBMS (serves as a middleware between DBMS and the clients) [1] [2] .
The technologies of intrusion detection, transaction processing, and database auditing can be used to develop an intrusion tolerant database system. Damage Assessment is the most critical phase during the whole damage recovery process [7] . The Damage assessor concerns the issues on how the damage appears and in what way the damage can be detected and exposed. Nowadays, most damage assessment algorithms rely on a model on how innocent data are affected in a compromised database system (denoted damage spreading patterns). The model evaluates damage spreading patterns by analyzing the dependencies between transactions. A Read-Write Dependency is the most common damage spreading pattern: in a transaction history H: T 1 , ..., T 2 .... Supposing transaction T 2 reads the results modified by transaction T 1 (we claim that transaction T 2 is read-write dependent upon T 1 ), and then writes data x to the database system, then we say transaction T 2 is affected by T 1 and data x is corrupted. Existing damage assessment models deal with this kind of damage spreading pattern, and various algorithms and prototypes were developed based on it. However, except for the Read-Write Dependency, do there exist any other dependency relationships between transactions that cause damage spreading? To answer this question, some deeper issues towards the inter-transaction dependencies should be referred to. In essence, the dependency between transactions derives from the issue of data sharing. The read or write operations in different transactions towards the same data may generate a dependency relationship between the transactions. For a data item x and transaction T 1 and T 2 (T 2 is scheduled after T 1 ), there are totally four data sharing modes that may connect T 1 and T 2 together: 1)∃ a read operation r 1 in T 1 and a read operation r 2 in T 2 , r 1 and r 2 read x ; 2)∃ a read operation r 1 in T 1 and a write operation w 2 in T 2 , r 1 read x and w 2 write x ; 3)∃ a write operation w 1 in T 1 and a read operation r 2 in T 2 , w 1 write x and r 2 read x ; 4) ∃ a write operation w 1 in T 1 and a write operation w 2 in T 2 , both w 1 and w 2 write x. We denote above four situations Read-Read mode, Write-Read mode, Read-Write mode, and Write-Write mode separately. The Read-Read and Write-Read modes do not lead to a dependency relationship from T 2 to T 1 because the read operation in transaction T 2 can not cause a state transition for database system (we claim that only write operations can change the DB state). So we focus on the Read-Write and Write-Write modes, and extract dependency relationships between transactions due to the two categories of data sharing modes.
In this paper, we systematically analyze the dependency relationships between transactions corresponding to the Read-Write and Write-Write data sharing modes. We proposed four novel inter-transaction dependency relationships which may lead to damage propagation, and illustrate how these dependencies help the damages to spread to a larger scale. Based on that, we propose our damage assessment model to detect affected transactions that are corrupted by the malicious transactions due to the new proposed inter-transaction dependencies. The model is an essential extension to existing read-write dependency model, and makes the results of damage recovery more accurate.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 is devoted to the review of existing damage assessment methods and damage repair systems. In section 3 we analyze the dependency relationships between transactions according to the Read-Write and Write-Write data sharing modes, and give the formal descriptions of four inter-transaction dependencies which may cause damage propagation. In section 4, we propose an extended damage assessment model by taking the new dependency relationships into account. Section 5 discusses the essential features of our model.
Related Work
There are mainly two categories of damage assessment models. The first is Application Level Damage Tracking [6] [8] . In this model, an application-programanalyzer module is constructed to capture the damage propagation in the application layer. Supposing a variable x in a program is corrupted by a malicious user, damage can be spread to the data whose producer references to the variable x. Furthermore, in case that an IF-ELSE code fragment references to the variable x, the control logic for the program can be changed and the damage may be propagated due to the corrupted logic control caused by variable x. Application level damage tracking is devoted to capture above damage spreading patterns and record the related information so as to facilitate the recovery activities (e.g. the before image of corrupted data). The second damage assessment model is Inter-Transaction Dependency Tracking. This model assesses the damage scale in the layer of database system. Transactions which have a dependency relationship with the malicious transactions are identified as affected and those data whose producer is affected are labeled corrupted. A Read-Write Dependency is the most common damage spreading pattern investigated so far. Yu et al. proposed another damage spreading pattern: Control Dependency [9] . Transaction T 2 being control dependent on T 1 indicates that the execution of transaction T 2 is determined by transaction T 1 . In database layer, the control dependency is mainly caused by triggers. A control dependency on a malicious transaction causes damage spreading to an incorrect execution path. Since triggers can be considered as a fragment of code, so to some extent, the control dependency is much similar to application level tracking.
Comparing the two models, the application level damage tracking is more accurate and effective. In the application layer, the inherent program structure can describe the read-write dependency relationship between data evidently, while on the contrary, the SQL is not capable to express the complicated semantics (the sequence, branch and cycle structure (IF-ELSE, WHILE etc.)) if stored procedure is not used. However, in database level, a log of transaction history can be easily obtained from the inherent mechanisms in DBMS such as auditing and trigger, so that the damage tracking becomes not so complicated based on the transaction log. Due to the simplicity and efficiency of database level tracking, the inter-transaction dependency tracking model draws much attention in recent decades. Up to now, most self-healing systems still adopt the inter-transaction dependency tracking model for the damage assessment [3] [10][11] [12] .
Existing inter-transaction dependency tracking model is incomplete, and certain dependencies between transactions have not been concerned. Consequently, the damage assessment algorithms causes a violation to Completeness Criteria for damage recovery [9] . To address this problem, we systematically discuss the inter-transaction dependencies that may cause damage spreading in this paper.
Inter-transaction Dependency Relationships Analysis
As it is described above, the damage propagation is mainly caused by the ReadWrite mode and Write-Write mode of data sharing. Extracting the Read-Write Dependency relationship between transactions is the basic resolution in current damage assessment model. This method mainly contributes to discover the damage propagation caused by the Read-Write mode. In this section, we focus on the Write-Write data sharing mode and analyze which kind of inter-transaction dependency relationships related to this data sharing mode may cause damage spreading. We discover four categories of inter-transaction dependency relationships which may produce compromised data.
There is a special dependency relationship between transactions: In a transaction history H : T 1 ...T 2 ... where transaction T 2 is not read-write dependent on transaction T 1 . If we construct a new transaction history H : ...T 2 ... which indicates that if transaction T 1 doesn't execute, then in transaction history H', transaction T 2 should have read some data which were modified by transaction T 1 in history H. Furthermore, if T 1 is malicious, T 2 should be regarded as an affected transaction and captured by the damage assessment. It seems that T 1 and T 2 are connected with some phantoms data which T 2 should have read in semantics (see an example in Fig.2 ). We refer to this kind of inter-transaction dependency as Phantoms Dependency (note that the concept has been mentioned in [6] [13] [14] ). The Phantoms Dependency is an important damage propagation pattern which has significant destructive power on database systems. Unfortunately, the former inter-transaction dependency tracking model does not consider the Phantoms Dependency, thus the damage assessment algorithms are not completely effective.
Application Logic:
An increase of commodity prices: we need the price of commodity whose price is more than $500 increased by 10%. Intrusion Activity: Assume that before the price increase activity occurs, there is a malicious transaction B1 modifies the product rice's price from $400 to $600. The correspondent transaction history is described as follows: Correlated Database Layer SQL statements: G0: UPDATE product SET price = 600 WHERE product name = "rice"; B1: UPDATE product SET price = 400 WHERE product name = "rice"; G1: UPDATE product SET price = 1.1 * price WHERE price > 500; -In the application above, we can see that transaction G1 did not read from B1, and thus there was no read-write dependency from G1 to B1. So in traditional intertransaction damage tracking model, G1 would not been treated as an affected transaction, and only malicious transaction B1 would be undone. -Suppose we only undid malicious transaction B1, then the price of product rice was written back to $400. But is that the correct recovery result? Obviously no, because all products' prices increased by 10%, except for the product rice! Therefore, we conclude that the execution of transaction B1 did affect transaction G1, and G1 was no longer innocent. -In a deeper sight, if B1 did not exist, G1 should have read the record "rice" and made modifications on its price. But in fact, the transaction B1 did exist, and the undo transaction for B1 made the recovery result incomplete for the product rice's price did not increase. Some modifications requested by transaction G1 were lost. In the common sense, It seemed that G1 was affected by B1 for G1 read a phantom data "rice". We denote the dependency from G1 to B1 as Phantoms Dependency.
A novel damage assessment approach should be proposed to track this dependency and identify G1 as an affected transaction.
Fig. 2. Phantoms Dependency between transactions
In a transaction history, some transactions' execution is dependent on other transactions so as to satisfy the inherent integrity constraints in DBMSs, such as Entity Integrity, Domain Integrity, and Reference Integrity). On the point of security, the integrity constrains may also help to propagate damage in the context of data sharing: Suppose that an innocent transaction's execution is dependent upon a malicious transaction so that the integrity constraints are bypassed for the innocent transaction, it can be indicated that the innocent transaction is not benign any more and it is probable to cause damage propagation. We summarize three categories of inter-transaction dependencies related to the inherent integrity constraints as follows:
Pseudo-Identity Dependency. In some cases, the execution of an innocent transaction is dependent upon a malicious transaction so that it bypasses the Entity Integrity Constraint. For the instance described in Fig.3 , malicious transaction B deletes a record (product id="P002") in table product (subfigure (b)), and then innocent transaction G inserts a new tuple with the same primary key product id P002 (see subfigure (c)). In this transaction history, it is obvious product id (PK) name price P000 that the execution of transaction G is dependent on B (if the product P002 was not deleted by transaction B, transaction G could not have been executed successfully). In our intuitive feeling, transaction G creates a new entity with a pseudo identity to substitute the historical object so as to satisfy the entity integrity constraint. We denote this kind of dependency from G to B as PseudoIdentity Dependency. The transactions that have a pseudo-identity dependency relationship with a malicious transaction should be considered as affected. Unfortunately, the Pseudo-Identity Dependency can not be captured by current damage assessment algorithms.
Domain-Integrity Dependency. The execution of an innocent transaction is dependent upon a malicious transaction so that it can satisfy the Domain Integrity Constraint. There are mainly two categories of domain integrity constraints (namely CHECK constrains) in DBMSs: field integrity constraint (e.g. CHECK (column1 < 50)) and row integrity constraint (e.g. CHECK (column1 < colmn2)). The inherent row integrity constraints in DBMSs protect the security of database systems; however, they are not capable to prevent all damage spreading patterns. For the example in Fig.4 , suppose that the application logic requires the purchase price be lower than retail price and imposes a row integrity constraint CHECK(p price < r price). The initial state for table product is given in Subfigure (a). Now consider the following scenario: malicious transaction B modifies product P000 's p price to $350 (Subfigure (b)), and then, innocent transaction G renews product P000 's r price to $360 (Subfigure (c) would return a value false). Therefore, the CHECK can not deal with this pattern of damage propagation, and even worse, one can not recover the product P000 's p price to the correct value (because when the recovery activity to undo the product's p price to $400 was launched, the function CHECK ($400 <$360 ) would return a value false). In our work, we denote the dependency relationship from transaction G to B as Domain-Integrity Dependency, and incorporate it in our damage assessment model.
Reference-Integrity Dependency.
As we all know, the inherent Reference Integrity Constraints in DBMSs provides the SET-NULL and CASCADE policy to protect data consistency in data sharing [15] . However, these two policies also help to propagate new damage if they are utilized by an intruder: A malicious DELETE operation on the main table will impose a negative impact on the slave table if a SET-NULL or CASCADE policy exists in the main and slave tables. Fortunately, the trigger mechanism in DBMSs facilitates traditional damage assessment models to recover the cascade deleted data in slave tables (the cascade delete operations in the slave tables can be captured by triggers). However, there is still a possibility that some innocent transactions depend upon a malicious transaction and thus bypass the reference integrity Constraint and cause damage propagation. For the instance in Fig.5 generates a new order O003 referencing product P002. It is obvious that the execution of transaction G is dependent on B. This dependency relationship should be captured by damage assessment algorithms. We refer to this kind of dependency from G to B as Reference-Integrity Dependency. Traditional damage assessment models cannot discover the damage spreading patterns caused by Reference-Integrity Dependency. Even worse, the corrupted data caused by B could not be recovered in traditional models: the rollback transaction for B would delete product P002 in the main table product. If a DO-NULL policy is used for the reference integrity constraint, the DELETE operation will return an error; otherwise, if a SET-NULL policy is imposed on the tables, the recovery for transaction B is incomplete because the order O003 still existed with the foreign key p id being set to null. Only the CASCADE policy will bring a complete recovery.
Damage Assessment Model
In this section, we give the formal definitions for the Phantoms Dependency, Pseudo-Identity Dependency, Domain-Integrity Dependency and ReferenceIntegrity Dependency between transactions. Meanwhile, a detail on how these inter-transaction dependencies cause damage spreading is explained. Finally, we propose our extended damage assessment model which is devoted to discover the new damage propagation patterns relative to the new defined inter-transaction dependencies.
Preliminaries
Before we propose the damage assessment model, we first introduce some basic concepts. A transaction history to be repaired is a serializable history generated under the two phase locking principle. We denote the committed malicious transactions in a history by a set B={B 1 , B 2 As our best knowledge, in DBMS, a write-involved SQL statement t is executed in the following process: 1) DBMS loads the data blocks requested by t to the main memory; and 2) DBMS writes back the modified data from main memory to DB files after t is executed. So on this point, we assume that when a write-involved SQL statement executes a write operation requesting data set x, implicitly, it has a read operation towards x firstly. For example, a writeinvolved SQL statement could be UPDATE product SET price = 1.1 * price WHERE price > 500. In semantics, it is equivalent to the sequence: SELECT price FROM product WHERE price > 500, and UPDATE product SET price = 1.1 * price WHERE price > 500. Therefore a write-involved SQL statement can be divided into a read operation and a succeeding write operation (this method was used in the damage assessment algorithms in [3] [6]). In our work, when we mention the read operation, it not only refers to the SELECT operation, but also the read operations in the write-involved statements. Formally, a read operation on a data item x for transaction T is denoted by [SELECT, x, img, T]
1 . The UPDATE statement has the semantics that it modifies certain data to new values. In a transaction history, it can be assumed that an UNDATE statement is equivalent to a sequence of a DELETE operation and a succeeding INSERT operation (for example, for a UPDATE involved statement UPDATE product SET price = $100 WHERE product id = "P 001", the statement first deletes the product P001 's price and then inserts a new value $100 in the same position). For simplicity, we use DELETE operations to denote the DELETE statements and the DELETE semantics for UPDATE involved statements; similarly, we refer to the INSERT statements and the INSERT semantics for UPDATE involved statements as INSERT operations. Therefore, an UPDATE statement can be substituted by the sequence of an DELETE operation and a succeeding INSERT operation. Meanwhile, we claim that the write operation consists of INSERT and DELETE operations (the objective is to omit UPDATE operations for simplicity). Formally, a write operation is denoted as [OPTYPE,  item, b img, a img, tran id] 2 . The existing models to detect the damage propagation are mainly based on the Read-Write Dependency relationship between transactions. Previous works [1] [16] give the definition of Read-Write Dependency relationship, and we introduce it to our work.
Definition 1 (Read-Write Dependency).
Transaction T j is Read-Write Dependent upon transaction T i in a transaction history if there exists a data item x such that: 1) T j reads x after T i wrote x ; 2) T i does not abort before T j reads x ; 3) every transaction that writes x between the time when T i writes x and the time when T j reads x is aborted.
In our work, we use the notation → W to denote the Read-Write Dependency.
Phantoms Dependency
Section 3 describes the problem for phantoms dependency. Intuitively, transaction T 2 is dependent on T 1 because T 2 reads a phantoms data from T 1 . In other words, if we change the transaction history and add an undo transaction U T 1 behind T 1 , then in the new transaction history, T 2 may read from T 1 . On this point of view, we propose the formal definition for the phantoms dependency as follows: We use the notation → P to denote the Phantoms Dependency. Transaction T j being phantoms dependent upon transaction T i is denoted by T i → P T j .
Definition 2 (Phantoms Dependency
)
Here [OPTYPE, item, b img, a img, tran id] means that the transaction tran id
writes the data item and modifies its value from b img to a img. OP-TYPE ∈{INSERT, DELETE}. For OPTYPE =DELETE, a img is null while for OPTYPE =INSERT, b img=null.
Pseudo-identity Dependency
As described in section 2, some transactions' execution is dependent on some other transactions so that the Entity Integrity Constraint may be bypassed. This inter-transaction dependency may cause damage propagation if a malicious transaction is dependent. This dependency should be considered in the damage assessment model. Then we say transaction T 2 is Pseudo-Identity Dependent upon T 1 , and operations op 1 and op 2 are Pseudo-Identity conflict operations. We use the notation → I to denote the Pseudo-Identity Dependency. Transaction T j being pseudo-identity dependent upon transaction T i is denoted by T i → I T j .
Domain-Integrity Dependency
The domain integrity dependency is derived from the row level domain integrity constraint. It means that if two transactions each has a INSERT operation towards the same row and if the data items that the INSERT operations write are restricted by the CHECK constraint, then there is a domain integrity dependency relationship between the two transactions. 
Definition 4 (Domain-Integrity
T i → D T j .
Reference-Integrity Dependency
The reference integrity constraints also lead to dependency relationships between transactions: when a transaction with an INSERT operation which references to another We use the notation → R to denote the Reference-Integrity Dependency. Transaction T j being reference-integrity dependent upon transaction T i is denoted by
Damage Assessment Model
With a set of malicious transactions as input, the damage assessment algorithm outputs the affected transactions as well as the corrupted data in a transaction history so as to recovery the database to a consistent state. The assessment process is based on a transaction dependency relation which is maintained in the execution period of transactions. The transaction dependency relation keeps track of phantoms dependency, pseudo-identity dependency, domain-integrity dependency and reference-integrity dependency between transactions. The formal definition of transaction dependency relation is given below:
Definition 6 (Transaction Dependency Relation for a Transaction History).

Given a transaction history H, and a binary relations
represents the transitive closure of relation D ).
Notation "→" is introduced to denote the transaction dependency between two transactions. Let
In a transaction history H: B∪G, where B is the set of malicious transactions and G=¬B. The damage assessment discovers the set of affected transactions A according to following recursive definition:
Discussion
To explain the damage assessment model, we construct a transaction history H based on tables product and order in Fig.6 UPDATE product SET r price = "650" WHERE p id = "P 001"; -T 3 : SELECT p id FROM product WHERE name = "grape"; UPDATE shopping cart SET quatity = 1 WHERE p id = "P 002"; -T 4 : UPDATE product SET r price = 1.1 * r price WHERE r price > 680; -T 5 : UPDATE product SET p id = "P 008" WHERE name = "apple"; -T 6 : INSERT INTO product VALUES ("P 000",banana, 100, 120); -T 7 : UPDATE product SET p price = 80 WHERE p id = "P 003"; -T 8 : UPDATE product SET r price = 90 WHERE p id = "P 003"; -T 9 : INSERT INTO order VALUES ("O003","P 002", 700); -T 10 : UPDATE product SET r price = 150 WHERE p id = "P 004"; According to our transaction dependency definitions, we can derive:
If the malicious set of transactions is B = {T 1 , T 2 , T 5 , T 7 }, then according to our damage assessment model, the affected transactions set is A = {T 3 , T 4 , T 6 , T 8 , T 9 }. Traditional damage assessment model only regards transaction T 3 as affected transactions. In fact, T 4 , T 6 , T 8 , and T 9 are also affected by malicious transactions. Therefore, our model captures a larger scale of damage propagation.
Finally, we discuss some essential features of the four novel transaction dependencies. In essence, the four dependencies can be regarded as an extension to the read-write dependency. For Phantoms Dependency, in above transaction history H, we have T 2 → P T 4 , since transaction T 4 should have read the record whose p id = "P 001" (the UPDATE operation can be seen as a combination operation of SELECT and UPDATE in semantics). The execution process of T 4 , can be divided into two steps: 1) looking up all records and picking up the records whose r price > 680; 2) updating the fields "r price" for related records. From step 1), it's reasonable for us to consider that T 4 has read all records in table product including the record whose p id = "P 001". Namely, transaction T 4 implicitly reads from transaction T 2 . Therefore, on this point, we can say Phantoms Dependency is an extension of read-write dependency. For Pseudo-Identity dependency in transaction history H, we have T 5 → I T 6 . The execution process of T 6 can be divided into the following steps: 1) Integrity constrain check: checking whether there is a record in table product has the primary key p id = "P 000"; 2) Inserting a new record. In step 1), the integrity constrain check can be considered that transaction T 6 implicitly reads the primary keys of all records, including the records which have been deleted. Consequently, Pseudo-Identity dependency can also be considered as an extension to the read-write dependency. For Domain Integrity and Reference Integrity dependencies, we can consider that the affected transaction implicitly read from another transaction in the period of constraint checking. Therefore, in essence, the four dependencies can be seen as an extension to the read-write dependency. Furthermore, from a technical point of view, it is a complicated process to capture the four dependencies. For Phantoms and Pseudo Identity dependencies, an additional table should be maintained to record the before image of each update involved operations. This is because maintaining the modification history is essential for damage assessment. For Domain Integrity and Reference Integrity dependencies, the constraints check should be transformed to a appropriate "implicit read" action. These properties require a more complicated technical resolution than handling read-write dependency. This also proves the useability of our work.
Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we systematically analyze the inter-transaction dependencies which may cause damage propagation. We propose to consider four new dependencies in damage assessment. An extended damage assessment model is built according to the dependencies. We also discuss some essential features of these dependencies. Though these dependencies can be regarded as an extension to the read-write dependency, they must be independently evaluated in damage assessment and recovery. We are currently building a damage assessment and recovery prototype based on our model by revamping the kernel of Dameng [17] database system. The evaluation results will be reported in an extension work of this paper.
